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UNCERTAINTY, IMITATION AND PLANT LOCATION:
JAPANESE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, 1990-96*
Abstract:
This paper combines neoinstitutional theory and research on political institutions to explain the
process of organizational entry into new geographic markets. We extend neoinstitutional theory's
proposition that prior decisions and actions by other organizations provide legitimization and
information to a decision marked by uncertainty. We show this effect holds in the presence of
uncertainty about market characteristics derived from a firm’s lack of experience in a market, but
not in the presence of policy uncertainty regarding the future shape of those market
characteristics, where policy uncertainty derives from the structure of a market's policymaking
apparatus. In investigating the sensitivity of frequency-based and trait-based imitation to firmspecific uncertainty, we examine the relative weight of social versus technical criteria across
these imitative strategies. Our empirical tests also introduce a new time-varying measure of
policy uncertainty in a country. This measure is derived from observable inter-temporal and
cross-national differences in the structure of a country’s political institutions. Our empirical
setting is a sample of 2,705 international plant location decisions for the population of listed
Japanese multinational corporations, across a possible set of 155 countries in the 1990-1996
period.
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Researchers in the organizations literature have long noted the tendency of firms to avoid and
reduce uncertainty (Cyert and March, 1963; Thompson, 1967). One prominent strategy for
addressing uncertainty is imitative behavior that serves to either legitimate similar behavior
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) or to provide informational cues that narrow the range of
uncertainty (Levitt and March, 1988). Although recent empirical research has shown that
uncertainty positively influences the adoption of different types of imitative behavior across a
considerable range of market contexts, this research has typically explored imitation either
within a relatively homogeneous set of firms (Haunschild, 1994; Podolny, 1994; Haunschild and
Miner, 1997) or within a set of firms that operated in a narrowly-defined set of markets (Martin,
Mitchell, and Swaminathan, 1995; Martin, Swaminathan, and Mitchell, 1998; Guillén, 2001).
Although this research has highlighted antecedents to imitation, including the idea that a
firm’s uncertainty about a market enhances imitation, it has not drawn a distinction between
uncertainty derived from an organization's unfamiliarity with market characteristics and
uncertainty derived from characteristics of the policymaking apparatus of a market that make the
characteristics of a market unstable or difficult to forecast even for firms experienced in that
market. We label these conditions firm-specific and policy uncertainty, respectively.
For market expansion decisions, such as recent organizational research on geographic
expansion (Martin, et al., 1995; Martin, et al., 1998; Greve, 2000; Haveman and Nonnemaker,
2000; Guillén, 2001), the role of both of these types of uncertainty is paramount. Even so, we
know little about how organizations with heterogeneous levels of firm-specific uncertainty about
a market, will respond to market choices in which there is wide variation in policy uncertainty.
We draw on a neoinstitutional perspective in a setting rich with variations in uncertainty across a
large sample of organizations and markets to provide new insight into arguments concerning
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how these two types of uncertainty influence imitative market entry strategies, and the relative
weighting of social and technical factors in those strategies.
The decision we examine is organizational growth in the form of the foundation of a new
subsidiary company for the purpose of manufacturing in a country different from an
organization's home country. The output of that subsidiary may be sold domestically and/or
exported to the home country or third country markets. In either case, we term this an
internationa l plant location decision. This decision entails significant resource constraints and
informational challenges (Haveman, 1993a) because of the limited scope for application of an
organization's knowledge and its production and marketing capabilities acquired in its prior
market activities to its new geographic markets (Aharoni, 1966).
By examining diversification across international political boundaries, our study
highlights an important distinction between two types of uncertainty. First, we consider the
impact of policy uncertainty induced by the structure of a nation’s political institutions and the
preferences of the actors that inhabit them. Political institutions that alter the costs of making
new or altering old policies can have a substantial impact on the stability of those policies. In the
presence of political institutions that induce policy uncertainty, a condition we define as political
hazards, ex ante evaluation of the likely future investment conditions is prone to substantial error
(North, 1990; Weingast, 1993; Henisz, 2000). Our measure of political hazards allows us to
demonstrate the importance of “political change and political social structures, including the
state in particular” (Carroll, Delacroix, and Goldstein, 1988) for market expansion, independent
of firm-specific levels of uncertainty.
In addition to this market-specific measure of uncertainty, we also consider the influence
of firm-specific uncertainty on international plant location decisions both directly and as it
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enhances the role of various imitative strategies. This consideration is important because
traditional economic studies have emphasized the influences of country- level variation in market
attractiveness and factor intensities (Markusen and Maskus, 1999:1) without explicit
consideration of the social influences of other organizations (Martin, et al., 1998). This approach
permits us to show how firms that vary in the level of uncertainty faced in the markets under
consideration for investment vary in their reliance on different types of imitative strategies, such
as frequency-based and trait-based imitation (Haunschild and Miner, 1997), or the seeking of
analogues in their own prior experience as a guide to a prospective market entry decision (Kogut,
1983; Chang, 1995).
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
In growth by geographic diversification, an organization must successfully counter uncertainty
surrounding the governance of transactions in new markets, to reap the desired benefits of higher
profitability, growth or survival (Martin, et al., 1998). Research has shown that organizations can
respond to uncertainty by removing transactions from the market, either by transforming
exchange relationships into power relationships (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), or by embedding
transactions in a hierarchy (Williamson, 1996). Even when making a hierarchical international
plant location, however, an organization can still face considerable uncertainty about investment
conditions in a host country (Root, 1968; Kobrin, Basek, Blank, and La Palombara, 1980).
Institutional theorists have emphasized that such uncertainty should increase the
importance of social considerations relative to technical counterparts (Festinger, 1954; Meyer
and Scott, 1983). One prominent social influence is the past behavior of actors in the immediate
interorganizational environment. Past behavior conveys legitimacy to subsequent consistent
behavior (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Hannan and Carroll, 1992).
Alternately, as a large number of peer organizations engage in a decision, it becomes common
4

knowledge, or a rule of thumb, to implement the same decision (Zucker, 1977; March, 1988).
Relatedly, as an organization establishes a pattern of behaving in a certain manner, consistency
with its own past beha vior may either be perceived as internally legitimate or become a rule of
thumb (Geertz, 1978; March, 1988). A contrasting perspective on the same phenomenon
emphasizes the rational nature of the imitation process, in which firms look for market signals
from their peers or from external capital markets that a given behavior is worth pursuing and thus
generate rational bandwagons (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993).
Researchers emphasizing both social and technical consideratio ns agree that imitation is
more likely in the presence of uncertainty, but this research has not distinguished between the
firm-specific uncertainty associated with a firm’s level of experience in a market, and policy
uncertainty that arises in a market due to uncertainty regarding the likely evolution of relevant
government macroeconomic or regulatory policies. Research that has exploited country- level
variation in studies of plant location decisions in the European Union has not included measures
of firm-specific uncertainty that might induce firm- level variation in the location decision and
the prevalence of imitative strategies (Mayer and Muchielli, 1998; Ford and Strange, 1999). In a
different context, Podolny (1994), examined choices of issuing partners with a market-specific
measure of uncertainty based on the grade of the bond offering but did not include a measure of
an investment bank’s familiarity with that grade of bond offering. Similarly, Haunschild (1994)
used a sophisticated measure of uncertainty based on the lagged forecast errors of analysts for a
takeover target, in her study of the determinants of acquisition premiums, but she likewise did
not differentiate among firms with relatively more or less firm-specific information about a
target. By contrast, researchers who included firm-specific differences in uncertainty in an
international setting typically did not include consider cross-national variation in policy
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uncertainty (Hannan et al., 1995). This omission necessarily emerges in studies considering
bilateral investments (Hennart and Park, 1994; Chang, 1995; Martin, et al., 1995; Martin, et al.,
1998; Guillén, 2001).
The Interorganizational Environment
We begin our hypothesis development by establishing baseline expectations about the influence
of interorganizational imitation on a firm's international plant location decisions. We consider
two types of interorganizational imitation -- frequency-based and trait-based -- which are
developed from the idea that organizations adopt different reference groups for imitation
(Haunschild and Miner, 1997).
Frequency-based Imitation. Decisions based purely on the number of other firms that have
adopted a given strategy are termed frequency-based imitation. Frequency-based imitation has
been observed in organizational studies of market entry (Haveman, 1993a; Greve, 1996) and
corporate governance (Fligstein, 1985; Palmer, Friedland, Hennings, and Powers, 1987) as well
as political studies of the behavior of nations and U.S. states (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Kobrin,
1985; Strang, 1991).
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): The probability of locating a plant in a given country will
be greater, the greater the number of prior plant locations by other firms.
Trait-based Imitation. A more selective process than frequency-based imitation is trait-based
imitation in which the practices of subsets of the population enjoying high status or high
similarity to a focal firm receive additional weight in the design of imitative strategies (Fombrun
and Shanley, 1990; Haveman, 1993a; Strang and Tuma, 1993; Haveman and Rao, 1997). Studies
of diversification have found that both the size and success of a firm enhance the sensitivity of its
peers to its actions (Haunschild and Miner, 1997; Greve, 2000) as does its industrial context
(Martin, et al., 1998; Guillén, 2001).
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Hypothesis 1b (H1b): The probability of locating a plant in a given country will
be greater, the greater the number of prior plant locations by other firms in the
same industry.
A firm also tends to imitate those organizations with which it is in social contact
(Marsden and Friedkin, 1993). Like the organizational experience of high status firms or firms in
the same industrial context, the experience of related firms can carry relatively greater weight in
the decision calculus of a firm, than the experiences of all other firms. Close ties between firms
lead to strong legitimization (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and facilitate the transfer of
information and clues to member firms about new opportunities for investment and growth
(Haunschild and Beckman, 1998). This form of mimetic behavior has been shown in populations
of corporate boards contemplating adopting the M- form of governance (Fligstein, 1985; Palmer,
Jennings, and Zhou, 1993), poison pills and golden parachutes (Davis, 1991; Davis and Greve,
1997), and takeover defenses and acquisitions (Haunschild, 1993; Haunschild, 1994), banks
adoption of new technologies (Pennings and Harianto, 1992), hospitals considering a matrix
organizational structure (Burns and Wholey, 1993), corporations adopting total-qualitymanagement practices (Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell, 1997), and innovation in biotechnology
firms (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doer, 1997).
Closely related to our empirical context are Martin et. al. (1995) and Martin et. al.’s
(1998) studies of Japanese auto firms following their buyers, competitors and non-competing
suppliers into the United States and Guillén’s (2001) study of Korean firms entering the Chinese
market. Like Guillén (2001), we focus on business group membership in which firms are tied to
one another by cross-ownership, cross appointments of employees and by set forums for meeting
and exchanging information. This form of association is not a buyer-supplier relationship, as in
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the vertical keiretsu studied in Martin et. al. (1995) and Martin et. al. (1998), instead it is a
collection of firms that compete in many different industries or organizational fields.
Hypothesis 1c (H1c): The probability of locating a plant in a given country will
be greater, the greater the number of prior plant locations by other firms in the
same business group.
Each of these imitative strategies can be driven by social as well as technical
considerations. Firms may be argued to gain legitimacy from imitating the most common
behavior in a widely defined sample of firms and that legitimacy may be enhanced by the
imitation of firms with whom the focal firm shares relevant characteristics or with whom the
focal firm regularly interacts. Similarly, the number of firms adopting the same strategy or the
similarity and/or strength of the information flow between a focal firm and the firms that it
chooses to imitate may also influence rational bandwagons.
Policy Uncertainty
In contrast to the stimuli provided by the interorganizational environment that share technical
and social considerations, we next turn to the purely technical role of policy uncertainty in the
plant location decision. In general, and consistent with the idea that organizations avoid highly
uncertain alternatives (Cyert and March, 1963), policy uncertainty deters investment, or entry
into a market where policy uncertainty is high.
Where a firm is uncertain regarding future regulations, rates of taxation, or even
macroeconomic policies, it is less likely to make long-term capital investments (Pindyck and
Solimano, 1993). Among the many sources of policy uncertainty, political institutions that fail to
constrain policymakers from altering the status quo regime are a prime candidate for influencing
investor behavior. Where policymakers can act unilaterally or enjoy high certainty that a
subservient or allied legislature and judicial branch will support their actions, future policies are
likely to be more volatile in response to either exogenous shocks, changes in the identity of
8

policymakers or even changes in the preferences of the existing policymakers. Such changes that
are the result of direct lobbying by host country competitors or incumbents are of particular
concern to foreign firms. We refer to countries that lack strong constraints on policy changes as
politically hazardous.
Empirical work examining the history of private investment in telecommunications in
five countries provides strong support for the hypothesis that long- lived and/or politically visible
investments such as those in infrastructure sectors are particularly sensitive to the level of
political hazards (Levy and Spiller, 1994). While the effects are likely strongest in the case of
infrastructure, the proposition that these hazards are negatively associated with the incidence of
foreign direct investment more broadly has also received support (Gastanaga, Nugent, and
Pashamova, 1998; Wei, 2000).
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The probability of locating a plant in a given country will be greater
the lower the level of political hazards of that country.
Firm-Specific Uncertainty
An important source of heterogeneity in a firm’s propensity to locate a plant in a country is its
prior investment experience in that specific country (Chang, 1995; Barkema, Bell, and Pennings,
1996). Firms new to a market are unlikely to have developed a heuristic for making an
investment, or to have a system in place for determining and analyzing the relevant information.
Inexperience thus heightens uncertainty about the market. One consequence of inexperience is
that an organization begins to rely more heavily upon social cues to make decisions (DiMaggio
and Powell, 1983; Haunschild and Miner, 1997). This can be transposed. Once a firm is
experienced, it tends to look internally for solutions, and it places a greater reliance on technical
decision- making criteria, instead of social criteria for investment.
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A firm's own experience facilitates foreign expansion because direct organizational
experience yields substantive information regarding a country's culture, its common business
practices, preferences of consumers, the process of policymaking, the preferences of key public
and private actors and the likelihood of policy change (Barkema, et al., 1996; Delios and Henisz,
2000; Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001). In one way, host country experience should make a
country more attractive for future investment because this experience is likely to provide an
analogue on which future decisions can be based. Beyond this direct effect, which we control for
but do not make the subject of a hypothesis due to our inability to discern this relationship from
that of unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity, firms lacking experience in a prospective host
country are also more likely to rely upon socially-based cues for plant location decisions because
uncertainty strengthens the influence of social criteria (Festinger, 1954; DiMaggio and Powell,
1983).
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): The positive influence of the number of prior plant
locations by other firms on the probability of plant location in a given country will
be greater for firms inexperienced in that country, than for firms experienced in
that country.
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): The positive influence of the number of prior plant
locations by other firms in the same industry on the probability of plant location
in a given country will be greater for firms inexperienced in that country, than for
firms experienced in that country.
Hypothesis 3c (H3c): The positive influence of the number of prior plant
locations by other firms in the same business group on the probability of plant
location in a given country will be greater for firms inexperienced in that country,
than for firms experienced in that country.
The richness of the international environment means a firm faces many countries as
potential sites for its plant locations. It also means a firm could have made previous international
expansions in countries other than the one under consideration. In addition to interorganizational
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mimetic strategies, previous international expansions can provide informational cues and rules of
thumb on how to respond to conditions in another country.
The notion that an organization's previous experience can serve as a guide to a related
decision is supported by research that shows organizations confine search to areas in which they
are experienced, when faced with high uncertainty (March, 1988). Prior experience within an
environment, or within an analogous situation delimits a reduced choice set, from which a firm
makes its decision (Geertz, 1978). The benefits of accumulated past experience for making
decisions under uncertainty have been found in samples of commercial bank s (Pennings and
Harianto, 1992), investment banks (Podolny, 1994) and acquiring firms (Haleblian and
Finkelstein, 1999). Applying these ideas to the plant location decision, we expect to observe a
positive correlation between a firm’s plant location decisions and its probability of having
encountered an empirical analogue in its past experience, which we assume to increase in the
stock of that experience. Once again, however, we cannot separate the direct influence from that
of unobserved firm- level heterogeneity, but we do expect that a firm will be less reliant upon its
stock of experience in other countries when it has investment experience in a given country.
Hypothesis 3d (H3d): The positive influence of the prior international experience
of a firm on the probability of plant location in a given country will be greater for
firms inexperienced in that country, than for firms experienced in that country.
In contrast to the firm-specific uncertainty captured by firm- level experience in a
potential host country, policy uncertainty derives from the structure of political institutions in a
market, not from the level of a firm’s knowledge and information about a market. It therefore
differs substantively from an organization's uncertainty about a market in which uncertainty
extends from a lack of knowledge or the absence of information in the organization about the
environment (Tushman and Nadler, 1978). An organization's uncertainty about market
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conditions like consumer tastes, culture, factor prices and political conditions, can be reduced by
the accumulation of organizational experience (Barkema, et al., 1996), but this accumulation of
experience cannot change levels of uncertainty resultant from political institutional
characteristics that make future policies less predictable.
The implication of this distinction between the two types of uncertainty is that there
exists a form of environmental uncertainty that is unrelated to firm’s level of knowledge about a
market and unrelated to variance in outcomes by actors that implemented a particular decision
(Haunschild and Miner, 1997). Consequently, firm-specific experience should not moderate the
impact of policy uncertainty. Further, organizational strategies of imitation of any type, prevalent
when a firm is uncertain about a market, should not be influenced by the extent of policy
uncertainty in a market.
METHODS
Setting
To test our hypotheses, we use the setting of the international plant location decisions of
Japanese manufacturing firms. Japan's manufacturing and trading firms began widespread
exploration of overseas opportunities only in the 1970s. The early 1980s saw Japan achieve
greater prominence as a source of world wide foreign investment. With the striking of the Plaza
Accord in 1985 and the subsequent revaluation of the yen, foreign investment became a much
more attractive option for Japan's firms, continuing a trend in which increasing strength in the
yen led to greater foreign investment outflows from Japan. Japan's outward investment in both
dollar flows and entry counts accelerated after 1985. At the time of the 1990 peak, Japan was the
second leading source of outward foreign direct investment (FDI) (United Nations, 1997). This
peak also coincided with the height and burst of Japan’s 'bubble economy'.
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The 1990-96 period that we examine begins in the aftermath of the collapse of Japan’s
equity market bubble. It continues through the subsequent recovery in foreign investment and
ends prior to the beginning of the next downturn associated with the Asian financial crisis of
1997. In this time period, manufacturing foreign investment, the establishment of international
plants, consistently accounted for 35-55 percent of outward investment in a given year. Joint
ventures were the most prominently used entry mode, accounting for about 70 percent of the
international plant locations made in the 1990-96 period (Toyo Keizai, 1999).
Sample
Our sample consisted of as many as 1,658 Japanese publicly listed parent firms whose primary
line of business was in the manufacturing sector. Six hundred and fifty-eight of these firms made
a total of 2,705 overseas investments in new manufacturing plants in 52 countries during the
1990-96 period. Our 1990s sample provides comprehensive data, rather than historical data on
existing subsidiaries, which avoids a sample bias towards plants that survived. Second, this
sample includes joint ventur e and wholly owned manufacturing plants because both modes are
prominent features of Japanese foreign investment and comprehensive reviews of foreign
investment identify that the market entry decision is often separate from the ownership decision
(Dunning, 1993). Third, this sample avoids the inclusion of any speculative investments sparked
by the late 1980s equity market bubble in Japan. This period also avoids data limitations on the
range of host countries in our analysis which become mo re severe as we expand the sample
period to include the 1980s or the 1970s.
We considered these advantages in striking a balance between incomplete investment
histories, and the attrition of cases from missing data, with left censoring concerns for the plant
location decisions of the firms in our sample. The result is that 77 percent of the investing firms
in our sample had made an international investment prior to 1990, with 66 percent of
13

international plant locations originating outside our study’s sample period. The dataset does
include the experience gained through these subsidiaries in its measures of firm-specific
investment experience and prior plant locations by other firms, and the sample does have
complete investment histories for each firm in the 1990-96 period. It includes annual time
varying covariates on each parent firm and for the macroeconomic and political data in 155
potential host countries, including the level of political hazards.
Data Sources
We derived our parent company information from four sources. The first was the 1999 edition of
the Nikkei NEEDS tapes. This source provided up to thirty-five years of annual data on Japanese
listed firms’ financial and accounting information. Using this source, we derived corporate data
for the 1990 to 1996 period, for firm sales and employment, R&D and advertising expenditures
and export revenues. Where necessary, we supplemented the Nikkei NEEDS data by referring to
the Japan Company Handbook, the Analyst's Guide, and annual reports. These sources provided
financial and accounting data, qualitative data on Japanese firms (e.g., lines of business), and
corporate demographic information (e.g., date of company founding). Our full sample comprised
all listed firms in Japan in the study's time frame. 1
To ascertain whether a parent firm located a plant in a given country in a given year, we
examined the list of Japanese foreign subsidiaries found in six editions of Kaigai Shinshutsu
Kigyou Souran-Kuni Betsu (Japanese Overseas Investments – by Country) (Toyo Keizai, 1999).
Toyo Keizai, Inc. compiled these data from information gathered in annual surveys of the

1

Non-listed firms also participated in FDI, with 2,914 non-listed firms accounting for 30 percent of the FDIs undertaken in the
time period of this study. Compared to listed firms, private firms were less active internationally on a per firm basis, holding a
mean of 3.02 FDIs, compared to the mean of 13.72 for the listed firms that had at least one FDI. Subsidiaries established by
private firms were, on average, 60 percent of the size of listed firms' foreign subsidiaries, by an employment measure. We
therefore conclude that while our results may not be generalizable to the population of private firms, these firms form a
comparatively minor component of total Japanese foreign direct investment.
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overseas operations of listed and non- listed Japanese firms. We used the 1986, 1989, 1992, 1994,
1997 and 1999 editions to construct our longitudinal profile of foreign subsidiaries.
We inspected the depth of coverage of Japanese Overseas Investments by comparing it to
other sources for publicly- listed firms, namely annual reports and industry and company reports
published by such bodies as the Wright Research Center. We found all but 33 firms (about 1.5
percent) of Japanese public firms that had foreign subsidiaries were listed in Japanese Overseas
Investments. Further, the 33 firms that were not listed had just 70 foreign subsidiaries, which was
less than 0.5 percent of the foreign subsidiaries listed in Japanese Overseas Investments. Given
the lack of public information for numbers and characteristics of private firms, we could not
make similar comparisons for data coverage, inclus ive of private firms.
Once we identified our sample, we joined the firm- level data with country- level data on
the economic, political and demographic characteristics of 155 potential host county markets. Of
the more than two hundred countries and territories in existence during our sample period, this
sample of countries omits only small island nations and city-states. The 155 countries in our
sample represented more than 99 percent of total world domestic product and population in the
years of our study. Of the 2,705 manufacturing plant location decisions that we observed, only
two were in the excluded countries (one each in Guam and Macao).
The complete coverage for our sample numbered 2,010,096 unique combinations of firmcountry-years. This number was the product of the 1,658 firms in our sample by 155 countries
and by 7 years, less those firm- years in which a country did not exist (e.g., the Czech and Slovak
Republics prior to 1993), and those country-years prior to the founding of a firm. Although we
had complete coverage in our sample for the theoretical variables of interest among the
population of publicly traded Japanese manufacturing firms and potential host countries, the
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depth of coverage for our control variables was less. We note, however, that in contrast to the
57.4 percent reduction in firm-country-years in our base specification from missing data, we lose
just 87 (3.2 percent) of the 2,705 plant location decisions.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables included in our econometric
analysis for the full sample for which data on each variable was available, the estimating sample,
and for the subsamples of the estimating equation in which a firm did and did not have prior
experience in a prospective host country and for subsamples in which plant locations did and did
not occur. For each variable, the percentage of cases for which a variable was available is
provided in the leftmost column. Table 2 presents a correlation matrix for all variables.
Even though the primary estimating sample was broadly representative across many
independent variables, it contained a notable bias towards countries that had comparatively low
levels of political hazards and had received Japanese foreign investment. Hence, the mean of
counts of prior entries by Japanese firms was higher in the estimating sample than in the full
sample. This suggests that we may have underestimated the effects of interest as the full sample
of countries included a greater percentage of countries with high levels of political hazards and
otherwise inferior environments where we expected the effect of political hazards to be greater in
magnitude.
Modeling Procedure
Let Hxit equal the hazard rate (the probability of plant location) for firm x in country i at time t.
According to our hypotheses there exist a set of country- and firm- level independent variables
(wxit) that determine Hxit .
Hxit = bwxit + εxit
So as to insure that Hxit is bounded by 0 and 1 in the empirical results, we employed a
logistic transformation (Log(Hxit /1- Hxit )). The coefficient estimates of b provide the change in
16

the log-odds for each one-unit increase in the independent variables. We allow the base hazard
rate (the intercept) to vary across each possible combination of year, industry and region by
employing fixed effects in our specification. In the discrete time logit specification (Allison,
1984), we created a separate observation record for each unit of time that a firm was exposed to
the hazard of potential plant location. Both the dependent and independent variables are time
varying and the latter include both country- level and firm- level variance. We estimated the
sample, with multiple observations across time for the same firm-country pair, using a maximum
likelihood estimator for the traditional logit specification. This technique addresses problems of
right-censoring and time- varying explanatory variables.
Dependent Variables
The strategic decision by firm x regarding a plant location in country i in period t was captured
by the dummy variable
Exit = 1 if firm x locates a manufacturing plant in country i at time t, 0 otherwise
There were 2,123 firm-country-years in which a plant location occurred. Among these,
422 included multiple entries by the same firm into the same country in the same year.
Independent Variables
Prior Plant Locations by Other Firms. We calculated the log of the count of prior plant locations
by all the Japanese firms in our sample into a given country in each year. Note that here and in
subsequent counts of entry or experience a plant location in 1990 would not appear in our data
until 1991 and that years of operational experience would receive a diminishing weight as they
recede into the past (Argote, Beckman, and Epple, 1990; Darr, Argote, and Epple, 1995; Ingram
and Baum, 1997). Seventy-six per cent of observations in our primary estimating sample
included a prior plant location of this type. To determine this count, we included all prior plant
locations on which we had data including pre-1990 entrants. This sample includes subsidiaries
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that exited; however, due to limitations in our data source our record of exits does not include
subsidiaries that were founded and exited before 1985, when Japanese outward investment was
still at a relatively low level.
Prior Plant Locations by Firms in the Same Industry. We calculated the log of the count of prior
plant locations into a given country by all Japanese firms in the same industry group prior to the
establishment of a focal firm’s foreign subsidiary. 2 We used a Japanese analogue to the 2/3-digit
SIC level, as categorized in the Nikkei NEEDS tapes. Forty-one per cent of observations
included a prior plant location in the potential host country by a member of the same industry.
Prior Plant Locations by Firms in the Same Business Group. This measure was the log of the
count of prior plant locations into a given country by all firms in the same business group
(horizontal keiretsu). Horizontal keiretsu are business alliances in which member firms are
integrated by such mechanisms as cross-appointments of directors and executives, crossshareholdings, and joint projects. Horizontal keiretsu therefore share certain characteristics with
the interlocking board membership often studied in U.S. firms as a source of interorganizational
imitation (Haunschild, 1993). In terms of technical considerations, the mechanisms linking
horizontal keiretsu members foster good information flows between companies (Gerlach, 1992;
Weinstein and Yafeh, 1995). Horizontal keiretsu have been called networks of knowledge (Imai,
1987), in which member firms gain information through ongoing trading relationships, personnel
exchanges from one keiretsu company to another, and collaborative projects (Lincoln, Gerlach,
and Ahmadjian, 1992; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1995). With these mechanisms, information about
foreign markets, along with resources related to finance, technology or other fields, is also a

2

Another referent group that might be adopted for imitation is the set of firms in the same global industry, but with a different
national origin from that of a focal firm. Data limitations precluded such an examination in this study.
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pooled resource among member firms (Helou, 1991), which can be useful to reduce levels of
uncertainty faced by an investing firm.
We did not include vertical keiretsu linkages in our tests, because the nature of business
relationships is qualitatively different between horizontal and vertical keiretsu. Firms in a
horizontal keiretsu are an association of businesses that compete in different organizational fields
and may or may not have transactional relationships with one another. Firms in a vertical
keiretsu exist in a distinct hierarchy of buyer-supplier relationships. These relationships are often
exclusive, or the buyer-supplier relationships between vertical keiretsu members account for a
majority of a member firm's transactions. Consequently, imitation in plant location decisions by
vertical keiretsu members is likely to involve a motivation to replicate domestic business
relationships in a new country, not the imitative behavior which is the focus of our hypothesis
(Martin, et al., 1995; Martin, et al., 1998).
To identify whether a firm was a member in one of the six main horizontal keiretsu, we
used the classification provided in Industrial Groupings in Japan (Dodwell, 1996/97). We used
membership in the President’s Council as the criterion to define membership. The closest and
most tightly-allied members in a horizontal keiretsu were part of the President’s Council. Hence,
this definition of horizontal keiretsu affiliation was most likely to capture any information effect.
Only 3.6 per cent of our observations included a prior plant location decision by a horizontal
keiretsu member into the host country in question.
Prior International Experience. We based this measure on a firm’s investment history
internationally. We computed it as the log of the sum of subsidiary years of international (outside
the prospective host country) experience. Just over sixty per cent of our observations included a
prior international plant location by the potential investing firm.
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Policy Uncertainty. Our measure of political hazards, the political hazards index, was taken from
(Henisz, 2000). It measured the extent to which a change in the preferences of any one actor may
lead to a change in government policy. First, using existing political science databases, it
identified the number of independent branches of government (executive, lower and upper
legislative chambers, judiciary and sub-federal political institutions) with veto power over policy
change. The preferences of each of these branches and the status quo policy were then assumed
to be independently and identically drawn from a uniform, unidimensional policy space. This
assumption allowed for deriving a quantitative measure of political hazards using a simple
spatial model of political interaction.
This initial measure was then modified to take into account the extent of alignment across
branches of government using panel data on the party composing the executive and legislative
branches for each country. Such alignment increased the feasibility of policy change. The
measure was then further modified to capture the extent of preference heterogeneity within each
legislative branch that increased (decreased) the decision costs of overturning policy for
legislatures aligned (opposed) to the executive.
The main results of the derivation (available in Henisz, 2000) are that (1) each additional
veto point (a branch of government that is both constitutionally effective and controlled by a
party different from other branches) provides a negative but diminishing effect on the total level
of hazards and (2) homogeneity (heterogeneity) of party preferences within an opposed (aligned)
branch of government is negatively correlated with the level of hazards. These results are
consistent with the theoretical work of Tsebelis (2000) and Hammond and Butler (1996).
Possible scores for the final measure of political hazards for a given country in a given year
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ranged from 0 (minimal hazards) to 1 (extremely hazardous). Appendix 1 provides more detail
on the construction of this measure, including a sample derivation.
Firm-specific Uncertainty. We computed this measure as the log of the sum of subsidiary years
of manufacturing experience in a prospective host country. Only 3.5 per cent of our observations
included a prior plant location by the investing firm in the prospective host country. We also
created an indicator variable equal to one when the measure of firm-specific experience in the
prospective host country was non- zero. We used the coefficient estimates obtained by interacting
this indicator variable with other independent variables to test hypotheses 3a-3d.
Country Controls. A country- level determinant of the attractiveness of a market-seeking foreign
investment opportunity, and the probability of locating a plant in a given country, is the market
potential of the host country (Grubaugh, 1987; Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Billington, 1999).
Three measures, each computed annually for the 1990-96 period, captured market attractiveness.
These were population (log), per capita GDP (log) and change in per capita GDP. The first two
variables measured market size and the last proxied for market potential. We also included
annual data on the average level of three tax rates for each nation – import (import tariff revenue
divided by the value of imports) and export (export tariff revenue divided by the value of
exports) trade taxes and taxes on capital – that were likely of interest to foreign investors. We
included annual data on trade flow as a percentage of GDP to account for countries that for
reasons other than the tariff rate were relatively open or closed to trade and thus relatively less or
more attractive locations for production plants. Finally, we included the annual flow of FDI as a
percentage of GDP as a counter to the argument that our measures of experience proxied for a
welcoming investment climate otherwise missed by our controls.
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Controlling for factor-seeking investment, or those cases where the output of a subsidiary
is almost entirely destined for export markets and the location choice is driven by production
costs not market potential, is somewhat more difficult due to data limitations. In robustness
checks we added measures that were proxies for the abundance of unskilled labor and the
strength of a nation’s infrastructure. We can also observe, however, that should the coefficient
estimates on per capita income be negative that would suggest Japanese firms were, on average,
drawn to a country not for its market potential but rather for lower factor costs of production.
Firm Controls. The capability to manage intangible assets has traditionally been assumed to
provide a multinational firm with advantages in competition with host country firms that do not
bear the transportation, communication and acclimation costs associated with managing a foreign
subsidiary (Caves, 1971). We expected to observe that firms with higher levels of these assets,
ceteris paribus, will have higher probabilities of plant location. We employed a five- year moving
average of Research and Development (R&D) intensity (R&D expenditures as a percent of sales)
and advertising intensity as proxies for the possession of intangible assets.
We accounted for firm size in our estimations because size itself can encompass other
variables, such as the financial resources available to a firm, that might influence a firm's
propensity to engage in foreign investments (Delacroix and Swaminathan, 1991). Furthermore,
large firms may be involved in industries in which foreign production is typical (Dunning, 1993).
Horst (1972), Owen (1982), and Li and Guisinger (1992) for US firms, and Kimura (1989) for
Japanese firms, found a positive relationship between firm size and the propensity for foreign
investment. We included annual data on firm sales to measure firm size, and note that the results
are nearly identical when annual data on firm employment is used as a proxy for firm size.
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Holding the size of a firm constant, its age may also have an influence on the pattern of
its multinational activity (Delacroix and Swaminathan, 1991), with young firms lacking the
knowledge to expand overseas, and older firms having a status quo bias in operations (Guillén,
2001). To capture this non- linear effect, we included a quadratic term for age, with age measured
as the years (log) since a firm's founding.
Finally, we controlled for the export intensity (exports to sales) of the parent firm to
capture other unobserved differences in the international orientation of the firms in our sample.
Like the intangible assets measure, we computed export intensity as a five-year moving average.
Fixed Effects. We used region, year and industry indicator variables. The regional fixed effects
proxy both for transportation costs, cultural differences and, to some extent, for differences in
investment motivations. For example, Japanese investment in Europe is typically market-seeking
while investment in Latin America or Asia is more likely to be factor-seeking. The regional
indicator variables captured time invariant differences across Africa, Asia, Central & Eastern
Europe, Central America & the Caribbean, former British colonies, the Middle East, South
America and Western Europe. Annual fixed effects capture variation in exchange rates and
global economic conditions.

Industry fixed effects capture across- industry variation in the

prevalence of foreign investment at the Japanese equivalent of a 2/3-digit SIC code.
RESULTS
Table 3 presents the results for the logistic discrete choice analysis described above
incrementally adding the theoretical variables of interest. Model 1 presents coefficient estimates
for the control variables. Model 2 adds the main effects for our theoretic variables of interest,
with the exception of the host country experience indicator variable which is added in Model 3.
Models 4 through 7 show individual interactions between the investment count or international
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experience measures and the host country experience indicator variable, with model 8 showing
all host experience interactions entered simultaneously, and model 9 adding the interactions with
political hazards. With the exceptions of models 4, 6 and 9, incremental chi-square statistics
show an improvement in model fit compared to a model’s respective baseline.
Referring to model 8, with the exception of age, age-squared, R&D intensity and the ratio
of trade to GDP, the coefficient estimates on the main effects were signed as expected (except
per capita income and the profit and capital taxation ratio) and attained statistical significance
with a p-value of 0.01 or less (except for the log of years of host country experience p=0.058, the
log of entries by firms in the same business group p=0.114, advertising intensity p=0.027 and
export intensity p=0.011). We discuss the support for our hypotheses in turn, using model 8 as
the basis for this discussion.
The Interorganizational Environment
Frequency Based Imitation. The positive coefficient estimate on the prior plant location by all
other firms variable and the resulting positive relationship between this measure of frequenc ybased imitation and the probability of plant location in panel 1 of Table 5 supports H1a. A firm
follows patterns of previous investment observable to it among a broadly defined referent group
of peers, here all Japanese firms. The economic effect of frequency-based imitation is modest.
Holding all other variables constant at their mean levels, a firm with prior experience in a given
country considering locating another plant in that country and observing that one standard
deviation more than the mean level of other Japanese firms (2008) have previously entered, has a
predicted probability of plant location 19 per cent higher than the predicted probability for the
case where other firms had entered at the mean level (501 entries) (see Table 6).
Trait-based Imitation. The positive coefficient estimate on the count of prior entries by firms in
the same industry and the same positive relationship in panel 2 of Table 5 supports H1b. Trait24

based imitation, where traits are defined by industry membership, exerts a substantial effect on
entry probabilities. Holding all other variables constant at their mean levels, the predicted
probability of a plant location for a firm with prior experience in a country where its competitors
have made one standard deviation more than the mean level of prior entries (57) is 46 percent
higher than the predicted probability of a firm whose competitors have entered at the mean level
(12 entries).
Although the keiretsu count variable has its expected sign (p<0.05), when only
considered as a main effect, we find no support for H1c in the keiretsu-host experience
interaction model (model 6), nor in the full interaction models reported as models 8 and 9.
Policy Uncertainty
The results provide strong support for Hypothesis 2 which predicted that increasing political
hazards would decrease the probability of plant location in a prospective host country. The
negative coefficient on political hazards reported in Column 3 of Table 3 and the same negative
relationships observed in Table 5, rega rdless of the number of prior entries by all other firms
(panel 1), the number of prior entries by other firms in a focal firm’s industry (panel 2), a firm’s
level of investment experience in other countries (panel 3) or in a host-country (panel 4),
demonstrate strong support for H2.
The magnitude of these effects is substantial. Holding experience constant, the reduction
in the probability of plant location associated with an increase in political hazards from a level
one standard deviation below the mean (e.g., Costa Rica, Ecuador, Hungary or Poland) to one
standard deviation above the mean (e.g., Afghanistan, Algeria, Belarus, Burundi) ranges from 40
to 60 percent. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that uncertainty over future policy
regimes acts as a substantial deterrent to the choice of a given country as a location for
manufacturing plants.
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Firm-Specific Uncertainty
The relationship between the probability of locating a plant in a given country and (i) prior
entries by all other firms (H3a), (ii) prior entries by other firms in the same industry (H3b), and
(iii) a firm’s stock of international experience (H3d) is larger for those countries in which firmspecific uncertainty is high; that is, when the focal firm has no country-specific experience.
Support for these hypotheses is found by examining the coefficient estimate on the interaction
between the indicator variable for focal firm experience in the prospective host country and the
theoretical variable of interest. In each case, where the coefficient estimate is statistically
significant, it is negative suggesting that the diminution of firm-specific uncertainty moderates
the adoption of imitative strategies. As a result, the predicted probabilities of plant location in
Table 5 are more sensitive to the behavior of various referent groups when firm-specific
uncertainty is high as shown in the comparison between columns 1 and 2 of Table 6. We did not
find support for H3c which posited that investing firm experience in the host country wo uld
moderate the impact of prior entries by firms in the same business group, while support for H3a
was attained with a p-value of 0.09.
The economic magnitude of these predicted differences is striking as shown in Column 3
of Table 6. The predicted increase in the probability of entry based on an increase in entries by
all other firms of one standard deviation from its mean is more than four times larger when firmspecific uncertainty is high (84 per cent as compared to 19 per cent). Turning to prior entries by
other firms in the same industry, the increase in the predicted probability of entry resulting from
a one standard deviation increase from the mean level is more modest, at 2.35 time larger, in
going from a 46 per cent increase when firm-specific uncertainty is low to an increase of 107 per
cent when firm-specific uncertainty is high.
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Hypothesis 3d predicted that the impact of firm-specific experience in third countries
would also be larger in the absence of firm-specific experience in a host country market. Here
the predicted probability of entry with firm-specific experience in the host country increased by
18 per cent as an investing firm’s experience in third countries increased by one standard
deviation (181 subsidiary-years) from its mean level (70 subsidiary- years) compared to 150 per
cent in the absence of such experience (an increase of 834 per cent). As a whole, these results
suggest that where a firm lacks specific experience in a given country it faces more uncertainty
about the business environment and relies more heavily on informational cues from its peers, its
competitors and its own past experience.
While we can not hypothesize about a null result, we note that in contrast to the strong
role observed for firm- specific uncertainty in increasing the prevalence of imitative strategies,
only one of the coefficient estimates on the interactions between our measure of policy
uncertainty (political hazards) and the measures of frequency- and trait-based imitation was
statistically significant. As a whole, one fails to reject the null hypothesis that all of the
coefficient estimates on this set of interaction terms are equal to zero (‘delta’ chi-square model 8
to 9 equals 4, p>0.10).
Control Variables
The positive and significant coefficients on the population and per capita GDP growth terms
show that firms were drawn to countries with larger market potential. Countries with lower per
capita incomes, however, attracted more foreign investment suggesting the presence of factorseeking as well as market-seeking motivations. Low tax rates for imported goods and for exports
were also important. A large inward flow of foreign direct investment similarly increased the
predicted probability of plant location. The level of openness to trade was irrelevant for the plant
location decision.
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Large firms were substantially more likely to locate a plant in a foreign country as were
export intensive firms. The relatively weak results for the proxies for intangible assets (only
advertising intensity attained statis tical significance), while surprising, were not completely
unexpected in the case of Japanese firms. As Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1996) have shown, not
all Japanese firms are motivated to undertake foreign investment in response to the possession of
proprietary assets. Firms that do not possess such asset-based advantages often expand
internationally to follow client/buyer firms, as industrial networks in Japan are replicated abroad
by such investment. To further investigate this effect, it is necessary to distinguish between
leading firms (those that expand internationally to extend proprietary advantages, e.g., Toyota),
and follower firms that are part of the replicated network (e.g., Toyota's parts suppliers) (Martin,
et al., 1995). Among the remaining variables, age was not a relevant effect for plant locations,
while the regional, year and industry indicator variables were highly significant as a group and
independently.
SENSITIVITY TESTS
An important question about our choice of specification involves the inclusion of firm-countryyears in which no investment occurred. On the one hand, these observations might be thought of
as containing valuable information regarding the determinants of non-entry. On the other hand,
their inclusion presents the risk of confounding the propensity to enter any foreign country with
the determinants of entry into a specific country. The conditional logit specification (McFadden,
1974; Greene, 1997) addresses this concern and we present, in columns 10 and 11 of Table 4,
qualitatively similar results obtained using that specification. Note that variables that vary only
by firm (as opposed to across countries) are inestimable using this specification. We are
therefore unable to test for support of H3d or to provide coefficient estimates for firm control
variables. Further, the estimating sample is non-comparable as we are able to include only those
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firm- years in which an investment event occurred. Finally, the underlying assumption of the
independence of irrelevant alternatives is likely violated in our context.
A random parameter logit specification, which is a more general form of the conditional
logit, would address these limitations but it, unfortunately, relies on computationally demanding
simulations that are infeasible given the scale of our dataset. Further, empirical evidence using
the random parameter logit specification suggests that, in most instances, results do not vary
appreciably from those obtained using a discrete time logit (Chung and Alcacer, 2000). With
these qualifications in mind, the strong similarity in results across the columns provides
confidence that the potential confound of entry rates and determinants of entry do not introduce
any serious bias to our results. 3
A second concern about our results revolved around the extent of independence of our
observations across time. In particular, it seems likely that a decision by a firm not to locate a
plant in a given country in one year is highly correlated with the same decision in a subsequent
year. While, once again, the random parameter logit (Chung and Alcacer, 2000) would address
this problem, it was computationally infeasible to implement. As we want to insure we were not
biasing our standard errors downwards by incorporating repeated observations over time for a
firm-country pair in our sample, we collapsed our sample into observations of the number of
plant locations by a given firm in a given country over the 1990-96 period. We took the mean
scores for the independent variables except for the entry count and experience measures where
we employed initial values to eliminate the problem of endogeneity caused by an entry in the
early period of our sample increasing the count of “prior” entries of experience on the right hand
side of the specification. Columns 12 and 13 in Table 4 rerun the specifications of columns 2 and
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We thank an anonymous referee for helping us to clarify this issue.
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8 in Table 3 using this cross-sectional dataset. We observed highly similar results in these
specifications. We note, however, that interaction terms with a firm’s host country experience
tend towards insignificance because we lose variance in firm experience by the contraction of
observations into a cross-sectional sample that fails to distinguish between single and multiple
entries over the course of seven years.
To address this problem, columns 14 and 15 report runs of the same specification as
columns 12 and 13 using a negative binomial estimation, not the poisson specification, because
one can reject the null hypothesis of no overdispersion with a p- value of less than 0.001. Now,
firm-specific uncertainty significantly enhances the adoption of frequency-based but still not
trait-based imitative strategies.
In light of the sensitivity of the support for H3c, another point of concern is the
possibility that we are capturing an oligopolistic reaction effect rather than trait-based imitation.
Similar hypotheses to our own derived from assuming oligopolistic or rivalrous behavior have
been a subject of study in the field of international business (Knickerbocker, 1973; Graham,
1978; Hennart and Park, 1994; Anand and Kogut, 1997). To test the relative merits of this
alternative interpretation, we calculated three sets of coefficient estimates that used the
specification of Columns 8 and 9 of Table 3 on a sub-sample for which we had data, derived
from the Fair Trade Commission of Japan, on the four- firm concentration ratio of the relevant
manufacturing industry in Japan as well as subsamples of those firms operating in industries
characterized by high and low concentration.
If oligopolistic reaction rather than imitation was operative, we would expect to observe
that the coefficient estimates on the competitor experience variables were economically more
significant for highly concentrated industries. While the results are somewhat stronger in highly
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concentrated industries, the difference is relatively small and most of our theoretical hypotheses
retain support. Following (Caves, 1996), we also tested specifications that allowed the four- firm
concentration ratio to enter nonlinearly (using both a linear and quadratic term) and again found
no qualitative difference in the results. These results (available from the authors upon request)
lend support to our interpretation that imitation, rather than strategic reaction, is an important
influence on the probability of plant location.
Two additional concerns regarding our sample involve the data loss encountered when
incorporating the count ry- and firm- level control variables and the potential omission of other
relevant control variables. To address these concerns we reran the specification of Columns 8
and 9 of Table 3 using more and less inclusive sets of control variables respectively. We entered
proxies for host country infrastructure (telecommunications lines per capita and line losses in
electricity), the abundance of unskilled labor both entered independently (to capture the
attractiveness for vertical multinational plant location decisions) and interacted with per capita
GDP (to capture the lack of attractiveness for horizontal multinational plant location decisions)
and the existence of a civil or foreign war. The results are qualitatively similar across the
different specifications with the exception of the coefficient estimate on political hazards that
substantially moderates in magnitude or even becomes statistically insignificant when countrylevel control variables are removed from the base specification (results available from authors
upon request).
Finally, we also examined alternate interactions including using the log of firm-specific
experience in the prospective host country and both the indicator variable and the logged
experience variable. We were unable to improve upon the fit of the model using the simple
indicator variable as an interaction term (results available from authors upon request).
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This study investigated an important form of organizational diversification: international
expansion into new geographic markets. We proposed that the interorganizational environment
and policy uncertainty would directly influence a firm's international plant location decisions.
We also examined the differential sensitivity of a firm to its interorganizationa l environment and
its own prior international experience based upon its level of firm-specific uncertainty in a
prospective market. As our evidence in support of these effects comes from an international
context, and from a set of firms from a nation other than the United States, it provides substantial
corroborating evidence for the concepts of imitation and mimetic isomorphism, and the
relationship between these organizational strategies and an organization’s level of uncertainty.
More importantly, our study is the first of which we are aware to distinguish between the impact
of firm-specific uncertainty and policy uncertainty on the adoption of various imitative strategies
in the context of market expansion.
We first hypothesized that the number of other home country investments in a location
would affect plant location decisions. This prediction was supported as entrants locating their
first plant in a country were relatively more likely to imitate the past location decisions of other
home country firms. Second, we hypothesized that the number of previous entries by
organizations in the same industry or in the same business group would influence the probability
of locating a plant in a given country. This prediction was supported for the influence of
organizations in the same industry; however, the results for the influence of business group
members were only weakly supported by the data.
Next, we hypothesized that the policy uncertainty in a potential host country would
negatively influence the probability of plant location and here received strong and consistent
support across types of empirical analyses and model specifications. Finally, our results also
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showed that organizations, when faced with firm-specific uncertainty, relied more heavily upon
the past international expansion decisions of several referent groups of organizations as cues for
their own behavior. In contrast, the influence of policy uncertainty on plant location decisions
did not increase in the presence of firm-specific uncertainty nor did it influence the adoption of
imitative strategies.
Policy Uncertainty and Plant Location Decisions
We used the setting of international expansion to highlight the influence that policy uncertainty,
in the form of political hazards, had on the probability of plant location. In doing this, our results
contribute to research on organizations by identifying the important impact that cross-sectional
and intertemporal variation in the structure of a nation’s political institutions had on geographic
expansion. This influence occurs alongside the role of the interorganizational environment.
Although the political hazards measure was negatively related to the probability of plant
location, the strength of this influence was no greater for firms with experience in a country than
for firms without experience in a country. The insensitivity of the influence of political hazards
to firm’s level of experience in a host country shows that uncertainty inherent in the structure of
a host country’s political institutions could not be reduced by the accumulation of experience in a
country. This result highlights a crucial difference between firm-specific uncertainty and policy
uncertainty. Firm-specific uncertainty extends from a firm’s lack of information about a market
which managers may overcome by turning to social cues (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983;
Haunschild, 1993; Podolny, 1994; Haunschild and Miner, 1997). Meanwhile, policy uncertainty
is a technical construct that is a consequence of the political institutions in a market; hence, a
firm cannot change the level of policy uncertainty in a market by acquiring information about a
market. Consequently, strategies for dealing with policy uncertainty tend not to involve
imitation. Instead a firm can use a strategy that directly mitigates political hazards, such as
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allying with local firms (Delios and Henisz, 2000) to increase conformity with the normative
domain in a host country (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). The more basic strategy we observed is to
avoid investment in markets that have a high level of policy uncertainty. This latter strategy
agrees with a basic premise of organizational search in which managers look to alternatives for
which there is greater information, and avoid alternatives that are highly uncertain (Cyert and
March, 1963).
Imitation, Firm-specific Uncertainty and Plant Location Decisions
This research contributes to a growing body of research in neoinstitutional theory that explores
how social influences spark developments in an organization's strategy and actions. Mimetic,
normative and coercive pressures lead organizations to uniformity in actions and structure
(Fligstein, 1985; Haveman, 1993a). We extended prior related work that examined influences of
prior entry decisions by members in vertical supply chains (Martin, et al., 1995; Martin, et al.,
1998) by identifying and testing mimetic pressures emerging from two forms of
interorganizational imitation, frequency-based and trait-based (Haunschild and Miner, 1997). We
demonstrated these imitation modes were comparatively more prominent when firm-specific
uncertainty about a market was high. We also allowed for the possibility that an organization
could look internally, to its stock of prior experience, for cues about how to expand
internationally, when faced with uncertainty.
Although results were generally supportive of the predictions for the influence modes,
empirical evidence for trait-based imitation extending from the business group reference was not
economically substantial nor was the prevalence of this imitative behavior influenced by firmspecific uncertainty. This result contrasts with prior research that has found prior entry by group
members to stimulate market entry (Kindleberger, 1983; Martin, et al., 1995; Belderbos and
Sleuwaegen, 1996; Martin, et al., 1998; Guillén, 2001). In Guillén (2001), the expansions were
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observed in a confined, single-country setting, among 54 business groups. The business groups
in Kindleberger (1983), Belderbos (1996), Martin et. al. (1995) and Martin et. al. (1998) were,
however, vertically related groups in which uniformity in decisions might not be a case of
mimetic isomorphism emerging from social pressures, but instead the extension of finance or
buyer-supplier relationships to a new industrial context. Similar to our results, Chang (1995),
Oliver (1988) and Mezias (1990), did not find evidence for imitation in analogous settings in
which they explored the mimetic influence of interorganizational networks. On balance, there is
weak evidence for an isomorphic effect emerging from interorganizational networks, such as that
typified by business groups. The important caveat is that it may be necessary to define specific
sub- groups within a business group, for example high status members or the most successful
members, to test whether a mimetic isomorphic effect emerges from this sub-group.
Social and Technical Considerations in Imitative Strategies
As uncertainty should enhance the role of social criteria in plant location decisions, those
imitative strategies that draw more heavily from social factors should be relatively more
sensitive to the introduction of firm-specific uncertainty (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983;
Haunschild, 1993; Podolny, 1994; Haunschild and Miner, 1997). We noted in Table 6 that
differences in market entry propensities across firms with and without experience in a country
for comparable changes in values of our measures of frequency and trait-based imitation were
greater for the former than the latter. We interpret this result as evidence that while a social
component to industry-based imitation does exist (firms gain more legitimacy by imitating firms
in their own industry), a substantial portion of the observed imitation of such firms is based on
technical rather than social criteria. In our sensitivity analysis, we explicitly examined the
possibility that the imitation of industry counterparts was a competitive reaction rather than an
imitative strategy and were able, subject to data limitations, to reduce concerns regarding this
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alternate explanation for these results. Taken together, these results suggest that a rational
calculation is involved in this imitation, in which a firm gathers information from a competitor’s
decisions, and a firm infers best practices from the actions of a its competitors.
Limitations and Future Research
Research in organizational ecology has shown an interorganizational influence on market entry
in its density dependence model of competition and legitimization (Hannan and Carroll, 1992).
The density dependence model was developed in the context of organizational foundings, but it
has been successfully extended to the case of organizational entry into new markets (Haveman,
1993a; Haveman, 1993b), while ecological models of density-dependent legitimization and
competition have shown that these processes have cross-national linkages (Hannan, et al., 1995).
Although we demonstrated that the neoinstitutional theory concepts of legitimization and
imitation help explain international expansion decisions, we could not test an ecological
perspective because that would require data on all domestic and international organizations in a
country. Even though this would impose significant data challenges, research from economics
has shown that foreign entrants alter competitive conditions and the behavior of domestic firms
(Blomstrom, 1991; Chung, Mitchell, and Yeung, 1998), suggesting that organizational research
could inform research on entry and exit rates in domestic industries exposed to competition from
foreign firms.
Neoinstitutional research on market expansion strategy could benefit from exploring the
influence of the regulative and normative domains, in addition to the cognitive domain which is
this study’s focus. Political hazards, as a part of the political environment, are a component of
the regulative domain (Zukin and Dimaggio, 1990), which also comprises other features in the
international context, such as capital controls, exchange rate regimes and labor market
institutions (Van De Vliert and Yperen, 1996), that in turn can influence a firm’s perceptions of
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the comparative levels of stability and uncertainty in a market. Just as for situations in which
there is a high variance in outcomes from a strategic choice (Haunschild, 1994), but unlike for
political hazards, a firm might be able to mitigate uncertainty that extends from these other
features of the regulative domain by engaging in mimetic strategies.
Finally, our empirical results allow us to discuss the relative weight of social and
technical considerations in various imitative strategies in the context of plant location decisions,
but we did not examine other related decisions such as timing of entry or the mode of entry
(Delios and Henisz, 2000; Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001) or partner selection, nor did we
examine the performance implications of relying more heavily upon social or technical
consideratio ns in the plant location decision and these other related strategies. Subsequent
research should compare the survival prospects or financial performance of firms that placed
different weights on social and technical considerations in their geographic expansion strategies.
Such an empirical study could also exploit differences in policy uncertainty, organizational
structure, network structure and the “success” of geographic expansions.
Conclusion
Our results are among the first generated by large-scale archival data to demonstrate specific
processes by which social influences affect corporate diversification decisions in an international
setting. We distinguish between the impact of firm-specific and policy uncertainty on a firm’s
adoption of imitative strategies in geographic expansion. We highlight that, in contrast to firmspecific uncertainty, policy uncertainty is not a consequence of a firm’s lack of knowledge about
a market nor a consequence of high variability in the outcomes achieved by actors that engaged a
particular decision (Haunschild and Miner, 1997). Instead, this uncertainty underlies a market
itself. It inserts stochastic effects in a market that are difficult for a firm to mediate via the
accumulation of experience or the imitation of referent groups.
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Our empirical results demonstrate that firm-specific uncertainty magnifies both
frequency- and trait-based imitative strategies. They also suggest that while social criteria play a
part in imitation, among various imitative strategies, industry-based imitation has a relatively
larger technical component. Our analysis highlights the importance for researchers to further
explore the complex relationships between social influences, entry, growth and performance in
new markets, while explicitly considering the structure of the political institutions that support
those markets.
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TABLE 1: Summary Statistics for Variables Included in Primary Specification
Coverage*

Means
All
Primary Without
With Dep=0 Dep=1
Estimating Host- HostSample Country Country
Exper. Exper.
4.700
6.219 6.180 6.909 6.219 6.784

Variable
Prior plant locations in host
100.0%
country by other firms (Log)
Prior plant locations in host
100.0%
0.593
0.949
country by industry (Log)
Prior plant locations in host
100.0%
0.047
0.083
country by keiretsu (Log)
International experience of
100.0%
1.917
2.292
investing firm (Log)
Host-country experience of
100.0%
0.048
0.091
investing firm (Log)
Political Hazards
100.0%
0.664
0.541
Firm Sales (Log)
99.0%
10.385
10.597
Firm Age
98.8%
49.531
51.561
Real Per Capita Gross Domestic
93.3%
7.480
7.996
Product (GDP) (Log)
Population (Log)
100.0%
16.094
16.342
Growth in Real Per Capita Gross 92.9%
0.630
1.621
Domestic Product
Research and Development
84.2%
1.305
1.315
Intensity
Advertising Intensity
83.6%
1.679
1.680
Export Intensity
84.0%
8.811
8.795
Ratio of Foreign Direct
95.5%
1.738
1.927
Investment to GDP
Ratio of Trade to GDP
94.1%
75.100
72.663
Import Taxes (% of value of
54.7%
9.502
9.012
imports)
Export Taxes (% of value of
53.8%
0.776
0.803
exports)
Profit and capital Taxes (% of
58.0%
6.902
6.367
GDP)
* As a percentage of all countries (firms) in the potential sample.

Standard Deviation
All
Primary Without
With
Estimating HostHostSample Country Country
Exper. Exper.
5.700
7.319 7.317
7.294

Dep=0

Dep=1

7.319

7.079

0.851

3.664

0.943

3.706

1.209

1.440

1.342

1.374

1.434

1.370

0.059

0.751

0.081

0.956

0.366

0.496

0.386

1.567

0.487

1.820

2.193

4.997

2.286

4.727

2.153

2.166

2.126

1.344

2.164

1.723

0.000

2.589

0.087

1.523

0.374

0.512

0.000

1.009

0.501

1.707

0.548 0.372 0.541 0.561
10.545 12.031 10.593 12.127
51.445 54.661 51.552 55.542
7.954 9.165 7.996 8.043

0.343
1.385
17.144
2.154

0.308 0.341
1.487 1.358
16.570 16.245
1.310 1.610

0.380
1.500
17.140
1.586

16.290 17.767 16.336 18.827
1.564 3.193 1.612 5.542

1.470
6.695

1.608
4.741

1.587
4.774

1.520
3.352

1.603
4.734

1.635
4.137

2.036

2.496

2.497

2.478

2.853

2.496

2.695

1.679 2.225
8.785 13.278
1.924 3.056

2.363
14.478
3.524

2.366 2.371
14.439 14.166
3.634 3.661

2.207 2.367
19.088 14.432
2.806 3.637

2.597
16.392
2.615

72.371 80.686 72.677 66.896
9.203 3.749 9.021 5.024

48.243
10.305

47.573 45.751
9.905 9.149

82.934 47.536
5.190 9.100

60.907
4.960

1.285

2.143

1.668 2.020
8.521 16.339
1.909 2.418

1.313

0.341 0.341
1.360 1.327
16.248 16.225
1.845 1.604

0.829

0.107

0.805

0.151

2.728

2.771

2.816

0.465

2.774

0.497

6.286

8.577

6.367

6.391

7.631

4.443

4.432

4.162

4.443

4.341
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TABLE 2: Correlation Matrix for Variables Included in Primary Specification
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Prior plant locations in host country by other firms a
Prior plant locations in host country by industry a
Prior plant locations in host country by keiretsu a
International experience of investing firma
Host-country experience of investing firm a
Political Hazards
Log(Firm Sales)
Firm age
Firm age2
Real Per Capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) a
Population a
Growth in Real Per Capita Gross Domestic Product
Research and Development Intensity
Advertising Intensity
Export Intensity
Ratio of Foreign Direct Investment to GDP
Ratio of Trade to GDP
Import Taxes (% of value of imports)
Export Taxes (% of value of exp orts)
Profit and capital Taxes (% of GDP)
Entry (binary)
a

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

0.56
0.11
-0.02
0.19
-0.25
-0.01
0.00
0.00
0.57
0.39
0.15
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.04
-0.17
-0.22
0.12
0.05

0.16
0.01
0.33
-0.39
0.00
-0.03
-0.03
0.64
0.41
0.18
0.01
-0.01
0.07
0.07
0.09
-0.31
-0.15
0.17
0.09

0.17
0.27
-0.08
0.21
0.09
0.10
0.14
0.09
0.04
0.06
0.09
0.03
0.02
0.02
-0.06
-0.03
0.04
0.08

0.18
0.00
0.68
0.22
0.19
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.20
0.16
0.31
0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
0.00
0.04

-0.11
0.17
0.04
0.04
0.20
0.13
0.05
0.05
0.02
0.08
0.02
0.03
-0.09
-0.04
0.04
0.13

0.00
-0.02
-0.02
-0.54
-0.07
-0.20
0.00
0.00
-0.01
-0.05
-0.02
0.42
0.25
-0.33
0.01

0.26
0.24
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.13
0.16
0.12
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.04

0.97
0.00
0.00
0.02
-0.01
0.12
-0.10
0.02
0.01
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
0.01

0.00
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.12
-0.09
0.02
0.01
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
0.01

0.66
0.17
0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.05
-0.16
-0.41
-0.26
0.24
0.05

0.07
0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.13
-0.48
0.11
-0.05
0.02
0.06

0.00
0.00
0.01
0.15
0.01
-0.03
-0.16
0.03
0.02

0.16
0.27
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01

0.14
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01

0.01
0.00
-0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01

0.38
-0.12
-0.03
-0.01
0.01

17.

18.

19. 20.

-0.22
-0.09 0.19
0.04 -0.19 -0.13
0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00

Variable is a logarithm
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TABLE 3: Empirical Results a,b
Variable

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
Sample CS-TS CS-TS CS-TS CS-TS CS-TS CS-TS CS-TS CS-TS CS-TS
Estimating Discrete Discrete Discrete Discrete Discrete Discrete Discrete Discrete Discrete
Technique Time
Time
Time
Time
Time
Time
Time
Time
Time
Logit
Logit
Logit
Logit
Logit
Logit
Logit
Logit
Logit
Prior plant locations in host
0.230
0.217
0.229
0.208
0.217
0.224
0.236
0.234
country by other firms (ln)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
Prior plant locations in host
0.620
0.608
0.605
0.640
0.608
0.598
0.623
0.618
country by industry (ln)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Prior plant locations in host
0.033
0.034
0.035
0.034
0.036
0.034
0.008
0.061
country by keiretsu (ln)
0.034
0.032
0.028
0.030
0.201
0.029
0.772
0.114
International experience of
0.406
0.395
0.397
0.396
0.395
0.421
0.432
0.405
investing firm (ln years)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Political Hazards
-1.145
-1.142
-1.141 -1.139
-1.142
-1.138
-1.163 -1.303
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.006
Host-country experience of
0.650
1.103
0.971
0.652
1.564
2.504
2.489
investing firm (0/1)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Host-country experience of
-0.062
-0.088 -0.090
investing firm (0/1) X
0.150
0.093
0.087
Prior plant locations in host
country by other firms (ln)
Host-country experience of
-0.096
-0.096 -0.096
investing firm (0/1) X
0.016
0.041
0.045
Prior plant locations in host
country by industry (ln)
Host-country experience of
-0.003
0.037
0.017
investing firm (0/1) X
0.918
0.250
0.609
Prior plant locations in host
country by keiretsu (ln)
Host-country experience of
-0.234
-0.276 -0.271
investing firm (0/1) X
0.000
0.000
0.000
International experience of
investing firm (ln years)
Host-country experience of
0.103
investing firm (0/1) X
0.687
Political Hazards
Political Hazards X
0.001
Prior plant locations in host
0.986
country by other firms (ln)
Political Hazards X
0.005
Prior plant locations in host
0.944
country by industry (ln)
Political Hazards X
-0.081
Prior plant locations in host
0.044
country by keiretsu (ln)
Political Hazards X
0.043
International experience of
0.337
investing firm (ln years)
Political Hazards X
-0.026
Host-country experience of
0.779
investing firm (ln years)
Host-country experience of
0.134
-0.036
-0.028 -0.022
-0.036
0.062
0.100
0.114
investing firm (ln years)
0.000
0.265
0.388
0.493
0.273
0.088
0.009
0.058
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Firm Sales (ln)

0.718
0.241
0.251
0.246
0.248
0.251
0.292
0.293
0.294
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Firm age
0.005
-0.005
-0.004
-0.004 -0.004
-0.004
-0.002
-0.002 -0.002
0.514
0.527
0.621
0.600
0.612
0.621
0.766
0.742
0.744
Firm age2
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.701
0.475
0.560
0.543
0.550
0.560
0.664
0.637
0.638
Real Per Capita Gross
0.139
-0.525
-0.498
-0.482 -0.487
-0.498
-0.520
-0.492 -0.488
Domestic Product (ln)
0.029
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Population (ln)
0.851
0.372
0.380
0.382
0.385
0.379
0.373
0.382
0.381
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Growth in real per capita
0.042
0.037
0.039
0.039
0.039
0.039
0.039
0.039
0.039
Gross Domestic Product
0.000
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
Research and Development 0.011
0.006
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.011
0.012
0.013
Intensity
0.354
0.594
0.573
0.566
0.535
0.569
0.343
0.306
0.289
Advertising Intensity
0.033
0.030
0.029
0.029
0.029
0.029
0.023
0.023
0.023
0.001
0.003
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.026
0.026
0.027
Export Intensity
0.003
-0.004
-0.005
-0.005 -0.005
-0.005
-0.005
-0.004 -0.004
0.077
0.014
0.008
0.009
0.010
0.008
0.009
0.012
0.011
Ratio of Foreign Direct
0.005
0.144
0.140
0.140
0.139
0.140
0.142
0.141
0.140
Investment to GDP
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Ratio of Trade to GDP
0.005
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.724
0.732
0.640
0.761
0.732
0.742
0.664
0.657
Import Taxes (% of value
-0.063
-0.062
-0.061
-0.061 -0.061
-0.061
-0.062
-0.062 -0.062
of imports)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Export Taxes (% of value
0.133
-0.297
-0.293
-0.290 -0.287
-0.293
-0.294
-0.283 -0.285
of exports)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Profit and capital Taxes (% 0.043
0.028
0.030
0.028
0.028
0.030
0.031
0.026
0.027
of GDP)
0.000
0.008
0.005
0.010
0.010
0.005
0.003
0.015
0.014
Constant
-38.208 -22.656 -23.055 -23.185 -23.199 -23.050 -23.432 -23.862 -23.821
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Log Likelihood
-9237
-8549
-8526
-8525
-8523
-8526
-8506
-8498
-8496
Number of Observations
857,210 857,210 857,210 857,210 857,210 857,210 857,210 857,210 857,210
a
b

Coefficient estimates for region, time and industry dummies not reported.
P-values reported in italics underneath coefficient estimates.
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TABLE 4: Sensitivity (Robustness) Tests (Alternative Specifications) a,b
Variable

(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
Sample CS-TS
CS-TS
CS
CS
CS
CS
Estimating Conditional Conditional Discrete
Discrete Negative Negative
Technique
Logit
Logit
Time Logit Time Logit Binomial Binomial
Prior plant locations in host country by
0.455
0.552
0.219
0.235
0.236
0.257
other firms (ln)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Prior plant locations in host country by
0.386
0.367
0.697
0.696
0.599
0.666
industry (ln)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Prior plant locations in host country by
0.031
0.006
0.055
0.047
0.029
0.026
keiretsu (ln)
0.500
0.929
0.018
0.142
0.100
0.345
International experience of investing
n/a
n/a
0.526
0.537
0.461
0.503
firm (ln years)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Political Hazards
-0.931
-0.837
-2.099
-2.141
-1.689
-1.932
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Host-country experience of investing
3.117
2.461
2.653
firm (0/1)
0.000
0.000
0.000
Host-country experience of investing
-0.169
-0.119
-0.162
firm (0/1) X
0.025
0.102
0.013
Prior plant locations in host country by
other firms (ln)
Host-country experience of investing
-0.144
-0.086
-0.040
firm (0/1) X
0.014
-0.188
-0.485
Prior plant locations in host country by
industry (ln)
Host-country experience of investing
0.059
0.019
0.020
firm (0/1) X
0.114
0.656
0.565
Prior plant locations in host country by
keiretsu (ln)
Host-country experience of investing
-0.311
-0.371
-0.425
firm (0/1) X
0.000
0.000
0.000
International experience of investing
firm (ln years)
Host-country experience of investing
0.118
0.152
0.115
0.294
0.046
0.336
firm (ln years)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.029
0.000
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Firm Sales (ln)

n/a

n/a

Firm age

n/a

n/a

Firm age2

n/a

n/a

-0.306
0.002
0.288
0.000
0.000
0.207
n/a

-0.301
0.007
0.276
0.000
0.000
0.000
n/a

Advertising Intensity

n/a

n/a

Export Intensity

n/a

n/a

0.143
0.000
-0.004
0.001
-0.059
0.000
-0.312
0.000
0.021
0.042
n/a

0.139
0.000
-0.004
0.001
-0.059
0.000
-0.300
0.000
0.014
0.201
n/a

-4732
144,639

-4690
144,639

Real Per Capita Gross Domestic
Product (ln)
Population (ln)
Growth in real per capita Gross
Domestic Product
Research and Development Intensity

Ratio of Foreign Direct Investment to
GDP
Ratio of Trade to GDP
Import Taxes (% of value of imports)
Export Taxes (% of value of exports)
Profit and capital Taxes (% of GDP)
Constant
Log Likelihood
Number of Observations
a
b

0.219
0.000
0.007
0.406
-0.000
0.546
-0.661
0.000
0.526
0.000
0.055
0.046
0.006
0.698
0.020
0.157
-0.007
0.006
0.196
0.000
0.002
0.277
-0.083
0.000
-0.840
0.000
0.086
0.000
-15.585
0.000
-4339
142,723

0.264
0.000
0.008
0.355
-0.000
0.494
-0.654
0.000
0.525
0.000
0.057
0.040
0.012
0.452
0.015
0.302
-0.006
0.006
0.205
0.000
0.002
0.374
-0.084
0.000
-0.859
0.000
0.083
0.000
-16.269
0.000
-4322
142,723

0.110
0.000
0.007
0.322
-0.000
0.446
-0.525
0.000
0.444
0.000
0.019
0.439
-0.004
0.802
0.024
0.046
-0.004
0.050
0.163
0.000
0.002
0.220
-0.059
0.000
-0.711
0.000
0.089
0.000
-13.872
0.000
-4666
142,723

0.268
0.000
0.014
0.096
-0.000
0.111
-0.617
0.000
0.448
0.000
0.040
0.106
0.005
0.710
0.009
0.499
-0.005
0.017
0.200
0.000
0.001
0.697
-0.076
0.000
-0.795
0.000
0.078
0.000
-15.111
0.000
-5746
142,723

Coefficient estimates for region, time and industry dummies not reported.
P-values reported in italics underneath coefficient estimates
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Table 5: Predicted Probability of Plant Location in a Prospective Host Country

Number of Prior
Entries by Other Firms
into the prospective
host country

Number of Prior
Entries by Firms in the
Same Industry
into the prospective
host country

Subsidiary-Years of
Firm International
Experience

Subsidiary-Years of
Firm Country-Specific
Experience

1
10
50
100

Without Firm-Specific
Experience (Firm-Specific
Uncertainty High)
Political
Political
Political
Hazards
Hazards
Hazards
at mean
at mean
at mean
minus
level
plus one
one
standard
standard
deviation
deviation
0.090%
0.061%
0.041%
0.155%
0.104%
0.070%
0.226%
0.152%
0.102%
0.266%
0.179%
0.121%

With Firm-Specific Experience
(Firm-Specific Uncertainty
Low)
Political
Political
Political
Hazards
Hazards
Hazards
at mean
at mean
at mean
minus
level
plus one
one
standard
standard
deviation
deviation
13.92%
10.16%
7.32%
18.53%
13.72%
10.00%
22.39%
16.79%
12.36%
24.23%
18.27%
13.51%

mean – 2SD
mean – 1SD
mean
mean + 1SD
mean + 2SD
1
10
50
100

0.072%
0.134%
0.246%
0.453%
0.237%
0.767%
1.878%
2.788%

0.049%
0.090%
0.166%
0.305%
0.159%
0.517%
1.270%
1.890%

0.033%
0.060%
0.112%
0.206%
0.107%
0.348%
0.857%
1.278%

17.44%
20.91%
24.85%
29.27%
34.11%
21.43%
39.99%
61.35%
72.13%

12.87%
15.60%
18.78%
22.44%
26.57%
15.53%
29.76%
47.64%
57.40%

9.36%
11.44%
13.91%
16.82%
20.19%
11.14%
21.78%
36.14%
44.52%

mean – 2SD
mean – 1SD
mean
mean + 1SD
mean + 2SD
1
10
50
100

0.151%
0.267%
0.554%
1.161%
0.080%
0.216%
0.431%
0.581%

0.102%
0.180%
0.373%
0.782%
0.054%
0.145%
0.290%
0.391%

0.068%
0.121%
0.251%
0.527%
0.036%
0.098%
0.195%
0.264%

24.65%
34.72%
49.70%
69.81%
92.56%
15.06%
20.25%
24.60%
26.66%

18.02%
25.67%
37.55%
54.72%
76.16%
11.03%
15.07%
18.57%
20.27%

13.02%
18.70%
27.82%
41.82%
60.94%
7.97%
11.04%
13.75%
15.09%

0.053%
0.134%
0.334%
0.833%

0.036%
0.090%
0.225%
0.562%

0.024%
0.060%
0.151%
0.378%

17.90%
21.17%
24.85%
28.93%
33.39%
49.62%
55.35%
59.29%
60.95%

13.23%
15.81%
18.78%
22.16%
25.95%
32.78%
38.04%
41.90%
43.59%

9.63%
11.60%
13.91%
16.60%
19.68%
19.45%
23.31%
26.31%
27.68%

mean – 2SD
mean – 1SD
mean
mean + 1SD
mean + 2SD
1
10
50
100

mean – 2SD
53.60%
44.68%
36.09%
mean – 1SD
56.10%
47.19%
38.45%
mean
58.57%
49.71%
40.86%
mean + 1SD
60.99%
52.23%
43.32%
mean + 2SD
63.37%
54.74%
45.81%
Note: Probabilities are computed using significant coefficient estimates from column 8 of Table 3 assuming a 1990
entry by a firm in the transportation sector into Asia holding all other independent variables constant at their mean
levels for the relevant estimating sample.
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Table 6: Sensitivity of Predicted Probability of Plant Location in a Prospective Host Country
Without Firm-Specific
With Firm-Specific
Ratio of High to Low
Variable Changed by
Experience (FirmExperience (FirmFirm-Specific
One Standard Deviation
Specific Uncertainty
Specific Uncertainty
Uncertainty
from its Mean Level
High)
Low)
(Column 1 to Column 2)
Number of Prior Entries by Other Firms
84%
19%
433%
Number of Prior Entries by Firms in the Same In dustry
130%
46%
235%
Subsidiary-Years of Firm International Experience
150%
18%
834%
Note: Probabilities are computed using significant coefficient estimates from column 8 of Table 3 assuming a 1990 entry by a firm in the transportation sector
into Asia holding all other independent variables constant at their mean levels f or the relevant estimating sample.

46

Appendix 1
Deriving the Political Hazards Measure 4

This measure draws upon the theoretical foundations of work in positive political theory
that employs spatial modeling frameworks to demonstrate that policy outcomes are a function of
political structure. To construct a structurally-derived internationally comparable measure of
political hazards, one must simplify the structure of political systems in a manner that allows for
cross-national comparisons while retaining the elements of that structure that have strong
bearings on the feasibility of policy change. The measure focuses on two such elements: the
number of independent veto points over policy outcomes and the distribution of preferences of
the political actors.
Assume, initially, that the status quo policy and the preferences of all actors with
effective veto power (a subset of the executive, lower and upper legislative chambers, judiciary
and state or provincial bodies) are independently and identically drawn from a uniformly
distributed unidimensional policy space [0,1]. The variable of interest to investors in this model
is the extent to which a given political actor is constrained in his or her choice of future policies.
This variable is calculated as the expected range of policies for which a change in the status quo
can be agreed upon by all political actors with veto power. For example, regardless of the status
quo policy, an unchecked executive can always obtain their preferred policy. Investors face a
high degree of uncertainty since the Executive’s preferences may change or the Executive may
be replaced by another executive with vastly different preferences. In this polar case, political
hazards equal one.

4

For more detail see Henisz (2000).
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As the number of actors with independent veto power increases, the level of political
hazards decreases. For example, in a country with an effective unicameral legislature, the
Executive must obtain the approval of a majority of the le gislature in order to implement policy
changes. The Executive is no longer guaranteed their preferred policy as the legislature may veto
a change from the status quo policy. The Executive can, at best, achieve the outcome closest to
their preferred policy that is preferred by the legislature to the status quo.
Note that this initial calculation is based solely on the number of de jure veto points in a
given polity maintaining the strong and unrealistic assumption of uniformly distributed
preferences. However, neither the Constitutional existence of veto power nor its prior exercise
provide a de facto veto threat in the current period. Specifically, alignment (i.e., majority control
of the executive and the legislature by the same party) would be expected to increase the level of
political hazards. To allow for this effect, the initial measure of political hazards described above
is supplemented with information on the preferences of various actors. For example, if the
legislature were completely aligned with the Executive, the game would revert back to our
simple unitary actor discussed above with a hazards measure of one. The same exercise of
determining hazards given the assumption of either completely independent or completely
aligned actors was conducted for all observed political structures (every possible combination of
executive, lower and upper legislative chambers, judiciary and state or provincial bodies).
Further modifications are required when other political actors are neither completely
aligned with nor completely independent from the executive. In these cases, the party
composition of the other branches of government are also relevant to the level of hazards. For
example, if the party controlling the executive enjoys a majority in the legislature, the level of
hazards is positively correlated with the magnitude and concentration of that majority. Aligned
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legislatures with large homogeneous majorities are less costly to manage and control than
aligned legislatures with precarious majorities that are highly heterogeneous and/or polarized.
By contrast, when the executive is faced with an opposition legislature, the level of
hazards is negatively correlated with the magnitude and concentration of the legislative majority.
A heavily fractionalized opposition with a precarious majority imposes fewer constraints on the
executive due to the difficulty in forming a cohesive legislative opposition bloc to any given
policy. Information on the partisan alignment of different government branches and on the
difficulty of forming a majority coalition within them can therefore provide valuable information
as to the extent of political hazards.
Perspective can be gained by examining long-term time trends of these variables. From
1960 to 1998, the largest improvements in political hazards were recorded by countries
undergoing democratic transitions in Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe. Notable
deteriorations in scores were recorded only by Burundi, Chile (under Pinochet), Guyana, Jamaica
(1985-89), Lebanon, Nigeria, Panama, the Philippines (under Marcos), Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka,
Somalia and Uruguay.
These scores align closely with our intuition as to the level of and change in political
hazards in these countries. Furthermore, the measures are strongly correlated with the extant
measures more commonly employed in the literature including the aggregate country risk index
of The International Country Risk Guide (0.78) and the Polity executive constraint index (0.71).
Interestingly, one of the regions where the correlation breaks down in an important way is South
and East Asia which are scored quite highly (low country risk and strong constraints) by both
ICRG and Polity but, due to the lack of formal veto points, strongly aligned and homogeneous
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legislatures and subservient court systems scored quite high on hazards. 5 Events in the late 1990s
in these countries lend credence to the values assigned by the methodology described in this
appendix relative to extant measures.
The strong positive correlation of these three measures over the post-war period indicates
that, despite their different methodologies, the three measures track the same underlying
phenomenon: the quality of political institutions. However, the relative objectivity of the political
hazards measure offe rs advantages to experience-based measures especially in times of rapid
political change. Specifically, rather than wait for hopefully accurate improvements in the
subjective perceptions of country risk (ICRG) or constraints on the executive (Polity), the
methodology described in this appendix examines the structure of the political system and
assesses the likelihood that future government policy will be constrained. Observation of the
political transitions in Peru, the Philippines, South Africa and South Korea support this
hypothesis as POLCON values shifted in the year of the transition in all cases while POLITY and
ICRG scores shifted with a lag of up to five years or not at all.

5.

The 1994 scores for Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia were 7, 6, 6, 6 by ICRG

(out of a maximum of 7 with a 1994 mean of 4.1); 7, 4, 7, and 2 by Polity (out of a maximum of
7 with a 1994 mean of 4.8); and 0.59, 0.66, 0.87 and 1 on political hazards (out of a maximum of
1 with a 1994 mean of 0.65).
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